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Introduction
Throughout history, the sports entertainment industry has proven to be incredibly
resilient, regardless of what is happening economically around it. Outside of war-time
stoppages, most leagues have continued operation through recessions and depressions, with
the only reasons for postponements or cancellations of significance resulting from labor
disputes and lockouts. Despite this financial resilience in the past, the Coronavirus pandemic of
2020 and 2021 is one crisis that the industry could not weather unscathed. The pandemic has
had many widespread ramifications on an immense number of people and industries over the
course of the last year-plus, with infection numbers at the time of writing of than 100 million
people across the world and over 2 million deaths. Different people, and indeed different
countries, have responded to it in numerous different ways, to varying degrees of success
across all walks of life. Sports leagues around the world are no different. This paper will outline
and explore the responses of leagues in the United States and Canada, the United Kingdom,
and Spain, with an emphasis on how these decisions affected the overall financial health of
sports leagues within them.
While the brunt of the Coronavirus can be felt in nearly all facets of life, the goal of this
paper is to research policies specifically tied to sports. There is much more to the COVID
response than simple economics, but the scope of this paper is to dig into sports and the
financial health of leagues moving forward. The intention is not to downplay the severity of
health risks, so while the points will be based mostly around the finances of leagues, health and
wellness of both players and spectators will also be taken into account. This paper will not,
however, explore in-depth how major national responses impacted the countries as a whole.
Methodology
Given that the research will explore responses in leagues around the world, it is
important to determine which leagues will be discussed, and why they were chosen. First and
foremost, the biggest disclaimer is that research will be conducted across leagues of three
separate sports. For the United States and Canada, the leagues in question are the National
Basketball Association, and the National Hockey League. The leagues in the United Kingdom
and Spain, the English Premier League and Campeonato Nacional de Liga de Primera División
(La Liga), respectively, are soccer leagues. This brings up challenges in comparison, as the
leagues were already in different financial situations before the pandemic and ensuing
lockdown, and due to the nature of the sports some policies were potentially necessary for one
of the sports while not necessary for the other. This is in fact the point of writing this paper- to
explore which policies were implemented, and if those policies could have been effective across
the leagues. Therefore, while comparison between sports will be difficult, it was more
important to view leagues of similar cultural significance, timeline of season, and financial
standing rather than purely of the same sport.
Due to cultural differences, soccer is not a major sport in the United States, and
therefore comparing the soccer leagues in Europe to Major League Soccer, for example, would
not have been a valuable comparison. Conversely, the United Kingdom and Spain do have
basketball leagues, but they are not on the same financial plane their respective soccer leagues

are, and the hockey leagues within the countries are even smaller still. Thus, there would have
been similar comparative issues. That said, the three sports, and all four leagues, had seasons
running at the onset of the pandemic and have since started new seasons. Again, while the
sports are different and the responses needed are different, the similar timeline offers a picture
into how effective certain policies were and are, in terms of continuing the season interrupted
by COVID and examining how the next season was approached as well. This timeline of the
season is the main reason why neither the National Football League nor Major League Baseball
in the United States were ultimately not chosen, despite being the preeminent sports in the
States. Finally, in terms of a macro-level view of economic standing pre-pandemic, the NBA is
the third biggest sports league in the world, the Premier League is number four, the NHL is
number five, and La Liga is number six. This similarity in size allows for easier comparison than
say the NFL, which is the largest by a wide margin, or the MLS, which is fifteenth.
Pre-COVID Financial Standing
Despite the leagues all being relatively close in terms of revenue before the pandemic, it
is important to outline the specific numbers and main sources of that revenue. By outlining
each league’s financial standing before the Coronavirus hit, it will be easier to see why certain
decisions were made and assess how effective they were. The leagues will primarily be viewed
as a whole, despite revenue not being shared evenly between the teams, although this fact will
be explored later.
Beginning with the NBA, according to data compiled on Statista.com, in the 2018/19
season the league had a revenue of 8.76 billion dollars. This represented a 9.3% increase over
the past year, and an almost 70% increase from the $5.18 billion in revenue five years prior.
Much of the revenue came from lucrative television contracts, with the league’s contract with
TNT bringing in more than $1.25 billion per year, and a separate contract with ABC/Disney
bringing in another $1.4 billion per year. Another substantial portion of revenue comes from
sponsorship and licensing deals, as the league receives an estimated $600 million per year from
its combined 33 brand partners. The most valuable of these sponsorship deals is the agreement
with 2K gaming, who spent $1.1 billion on a 7-year contract to license the league. Additionally,
Nike spends $125 million of their own per year to remain the official jersey supplier of the
league as part of an ongoing 8-year deal.
Further, prior to the 2017/18 season teams were allowed shirt sponsors for the first
time. This initiative was a widespread success across the league, with all 30 teams initially
agreeing to partnerships. These deals are generating $182 million across the league, and every
team maintained their partnerships into the 2018/19 season. The Dallas Mavericks became the
first team to terminate their shirt sponsorship deal, before the start of the 2019/20 season,
although resigned with a separate sponsor in January of 2020.
Finally, one important note to make regarding revenue before the pandemic broke out
is the NBA’s deteriorating relationship with China at the time. China and Chinese businesses
were expected to be major players in terms of both television and sponsorship contracts for the
2019/20 season. In October of 2019 however, Daryl Morey, General Manager of the Houston
Rockets, spoke out against the inhumane treatment of protestors in Hong Kong. In response

several Chinese entities cut or suspended ties with the league. As the largest international
consumer of the league, losing these agreements cost the league hundreds of millions of dollars
even before the pandemic.
As for the NHL, league revenue topped $5 billion in 2018/19, up 4.7% from 2017/18, and
up 27.9% since 2014/15. Similar to the NBA, television contracts account for a decent chunk of
league revenue. Given that the NHL is popular in both the United States and Canada, they
negotiated separate T.V. deals in the countries. In the U.S., the broadcasting partner for the
2018/19 season was NBC, and that deal brought in around $200 million per season. In Canada,
where the league is debatably even bigger than in the States, the broadcasting rights belong to
Rogers Communications, who committed to a 12-year, $4.9 billion dollar contract in 2013,
bringing in another roughly $400 million per year for the league. Also like the NBA, the NHL also
takes advantage of lucrative endorsement and licensing contracts, with 2K gaming also
partnering with them to license the NHL 2K series.
Unlike the NBA, the largest portion of the NHL’s pre-COVID income came from ticket
sales, merchandise, and concessions. According to Statista the NHL generates approximately
36% of total league revenue from gate receipts, as opposed to only around 22% in the NBA.
This means that of the roughly $5 billion brought in from 2018/19, over $1.75 billion came from
gate receipts.
Continuing to the Premier League, the league brought in 5.85 billion euros in revenue in
the 2018/19 season, equaling roughly 6.7 billion dollars. According to an annual report put
together by Deloitte, revenue grew by around 7.5% between 2017/18 and 2018/19. Similar to
both aforementioned leagues, this growth was spurred mostly by effective broadcasting deals.
As a truly international league, the Premier League has broadcasting deals across a number of
countries, with their deal with Sky and BT in the United Kingdom as the crown jewel. The
domestic contract was a 3-year deal worth around 5 billion pounds, or around 1.7 billion
pounds ($2.3 billion) per year. Further, the international contracts were also 3-year deals worth
a combined 1 billion pounds ($1.3 Billion) per year.
As far as matchday receipts go, the Premier League has the lowest share of gate receipts
as a percentage of revenue of any of the four leagues, at only around 13% in 2018/19. This
percentage is low, however on a purely dollars-and-cents basis, this percentage still translates
to around 776 million Euros ($889 million). Lastly, like the aforementioned leagues, large
proportions of the Premier League’s revenue also come from sponsorships. Again, according to
Deloitte, in 2018/19 the Premier League brought in over 1.6 billion euros ($1.8 billion), because
of these deals, or 28% of their total revenue. These sponsorship deals ranged across many
different facets, with major sponsorship deals for the jerseys and for the stadium naming rights
accounting for a majority.
Finishing with La Liga, with stats coming from the Deloitte annual report once again, the
league brought in 3.375 billion euros of total revenue ($3.86 billion), a growth of 9.87% from
the year prior. The breakdown of their revenue streams is similar to the prior leagues, with
broadcasting rights making up the largest share of the revenue, followed by sponsorships and
then matchday receipts. For the exact data, of the 3.375 billion euros, broadcasting deals made

up around 54%, or 1.83 billion euros ($2.09 billion), 30% came from sponsorships, 1.023 billion
euros ($1.17 billion), and 15% came from matchday receipts, 521 million euros ($596 million).
While the statistics can be dense, in breaking down how the leagues made their money,
and in some cases from whom, it is easier to see why the leagues made the decisions they did
in response to COVID.
COVID Responses
While the revenue streams of the leagues offer a frame of reference for league health
pre-pandemic, it is simply meant to be a baseline and control for the heart of this paper- how
the actions of the leagues in the wake of the pandemic mitigated potential losses and
attempted to keep them afloat and successful into the future. Therefore, in this next section,
those responses will be outlined and compared to see how the leagues attempted to do just
that. First, the initial responses, or those within a few days to weeks of the outbreak, will be
outlined. Next will be the middle responses, or those in the months following the outbreak and
the restarting of the leagues. Last will be the responses with an eye to the future, or those
geared toward the 2020/21 season and beyond.
Though the initial outbreak of COVID cannot be precisely pinpointed, by early March
2020 it was a point of discussion, and some actions were being taken to stymie its spread.
Regardless of this fact, on March 9, Rudy Gobert, a player for the Utah Jazz in the NBA, made a
point of touching every microphone at one of his press conferences to downplay the severity of
the virus and add some levity. Unfortunately, this ended up doing the exact opposite as two
days later it was announced that Gobert had tested positive for the virus. Due to his antics at
the press conference, and attempting to save face, the NBA responded quickly by postponing
the Jazz’s game that night. While the initial outbreak in the states cannot be pinpointed, this
joke and ensuing postponement was the first domino to fall, and more drastic measures by all
four leagues followed soon after.
After the NBA’s initial postponement of the game, they made a statement that night,
March 11, saying that once the games already in play ended, they would suspend play
indefinitely. On the next morning, the NHL followed suit, suspending play themselves. Despite
not having any positive cases at the time, the NHL and NBA share 11 buildings across the
country, which was the main cause for swift action. Both leagues announced that play was
suspended in the interest of safety, and that they would continue to monitor the situation as
progressed. They did not give an exact goal for a restart, emphasizing the importance of
securing player safety.
Across the Atlantic, while the Rudy Gobert situation had no bearing on the immediate
responses of La Liga and the Premier League, they were having issues with positive tests of their
own. After playing a game in Milan a few weeks prior, a hotspot for the virus at the time,
Spanish team Valencia CF was dealing with the effects, and other players across the league
were also self-isolating to avoid contaminating teammates. Despite a desire to play the games
the following weekend, on March 12 officials from Spain announced that play would be
suspended across the league. In contrast to the NBA and NHL however, this suspension was not

intended to be indefinite, and the initial statement called for play to resume behind open doors
two weeks later. Despite this intention, they were forced to extend the suspension further
given a lockdown order issued by Spain’s Prime Minister a few days later.
The last of the four leagues to suspend play, albeit only a day after La Liga’s and the
NHL’s statements and only two days after the NBA’s, was the Premier League. Similar to the
others, this shutdown came as a result of breakouts among players and staff of multiple
different teams across the country, and on the morning of March 13 the Football Association in
the United Kingdom announced a hiatus with the goal of restarting on April 4. Like the
Spaniards however, as the climate worsened and infection rates rose, they too extended their
stoppage until at least April 30. Despite setting April 30 as a goal, the FA announced that there
was no intention of restarting in the short-term, simply saying that there was no need to cancel
the season and that play would resume eventually.
Now, it is important to examine just how crucial of a juncture this was, and the impact
and repercussions that this could have on the leagues’ financial health. First and foremost, it is
critical to remember that this situation was made for the wellness of all players, staff, and team
personnel, and that their safety was the reason why these decisions were made so quickly and
decisively by all parties. That said, full cancellations of the respective seasons of these clubs
would be catastrophic financially. At the time of the stoppages, the NBA had 259 games left to
play, the NHL had 189 games remaining, 92 games remained in the Premier League, and 110
were left in La Liga’s season. Given the circumstances it was clear that in-person attendance
was no longer an option, and this on its own was serious.
The total un-played games accounted for between 15% of the total season in the NHL,
up to almost 29% in La Liga, and that is not to mention the playoffs for the NBA and NHL. Based
on the data from the 2018/19 season, even for the Premier League, whose gate receipts are the
lowest relative to the other leagues and account for only 13% of revenue, cancelling nearly a
quarter of their games in a season means they would lose out on over $200 million from gate
receipts alone. It becomes even more drastic for the NBA and the NHL, with early estimates for
gate receipt losses for the NBA getting over $500 million. Losing these ticket revenues looked
more and more likely as the situation progressed though, and the bigger issue would be the
dent in revenues left by unfinished contracts with broadcasters or sponsors that could pull out.
For all the leagues, broadcast revenue represented the lion’s share of the total, and as such
they all made decisions to try to satisfy their broadcast partners.
The situation was similar in all four leagues, and as such they all began to evaluate their
options across the next few months. Over those next few months, policies across the leagues
were still relatively similar. All the leagues were completely shut down into May, but by midMay training was opened back up under strict guidelines. Once testing capabilities had
increased, the NBA, Premier League, and La Liga began voluntary workouts, with testing each
day to ensure the players were not transmitting the virus. The initial phases of response were
geared toward players getting back into shape and remaining healthy, however by June were
ready to pick the seasons back up and finish them out.

These continuation policies are where some differences show up between the leagues.
While no leagues cancelled their seasons, the European Leagues differed from the American
ones in that the Premier League and La Liga finished their seasons in their entirety, while the
NBA and NHL modified their seasons to include only a few games then the playoffs.
La Liga was the first league to resume their games and did so on June 11. With 110
games left to play, and with their sights set on restarting the following season as close to on
time as possible, the league’s goal was to finish the remaining games by mid-July. To
accomplish this teams played on average every three days for a month. By cramming so many
games into this period, despite the toll it took on players, it meant that every day the league
would have at least one game to broadcast from June 11 until July 13. In doing so, despite these
matches being played behind closed doors, and missing out on the gate receipts and matchday
revenue, they were able to fulfill obligations made to sponsors and broadcast partners buoying
these deals. Considering that they were one of the first leagues in the world to restart, this also
meant that more eyes than ever would be on their games as people yearned for sports
entertainment.
The Premier League restarted not long after La Liga and did so in much the same
manner. They restarted their games on June 17 and finished up the season on July 26. With a
few extra days to finish up games, and a few less games to be played overall, there were not
games broadcast every day, however it was close. Their broadcast partners had a mixed
reaction to the restart, as although they were pleased to get games late rather than not at all,
and potentially getting more eyes on the product, broadcasters still required rebates given that
games were not played on agreed upon dates. The main qualms came from the international
partners of the Premier League, who constituted a larger portion of partners relative to Spain.
These international partners, who made their contracts with the expectation that games would
be played in primetime given the time zone differences, were perturbed when the games were
scheduled to accommodate primarily the domestic broadcasters. That said, by both the Premier
League and La Liga cramming the rest of the season into this short timeframe it allowed them
to potentially restart the next season close to on time. It was hoped that by playing out the
season like this, any ill will from the broadcasters, and any potential rebates to be paid out for
the COVID season, would not carry over after the league started up the 2020/21 season.
The NBA and NHL restarted their own seasons much later, and in quite different ways to
their European counterparts. While the Premier League and La Liga played their games behind
closed doors in teams’ home stadiums and played all their games, neither the NBA nor the NHL
did these things.
As an overview, the NBA had more than 250 games left in the regular season when it
was put on hold, and those games were to be played by all 30 teams in the league. After
deliberation about how to restart, instead of all the teams playing out all their games, the slate
was dropped down to only 88 regular season games among just the 22 teams who still had a
mathematical chance at making the playoffs. The remaining 8 teams played no more games,
meaning their seasons effectively ended in March. Furthermore, in what is the biggest
difference between the NBA and the European Leagues, instead of playing their games in their
own arenas in the teams’ home cities, all the remaining games would be played in a “bubble,”

or an isolated area in a host city where only players, team personnel, and essential workers
would go.
In-terms of player safety, there was likely not a better way to mitigate the spread of
COVID than using a bubble. This was an area where only those essential to the continuation of
games would be, and under the expectation that the bubble did its job of isolating everyone,
theoretically there should be no positive cases for the duration of the season. Creating and
maintaining the integrity of the bubble was not easy though, nor was it cheap. The NBA had to
set up and operate the bubble over a span of nearly four months, from early July, when the first
players arrived, through to mid-October when the playoffs would end.
All told, experts estimate that the bubble cost more than $180 million, but executives
felt this was a needed investment. Again, this area intended to allow the league to effectively
ensure that none of the players would get COVID, and in turn this allowed them the peace of
mind that all games would be played. As a bonus, the bubble was set up at the ESPN Wide
World of Sports Complex in Orlando, Florida. Referencing the data from above, the NBA’s
biggest broadcast partner is ABC, a company owned by Disney. In a time when everyone was at
home in quarantine, this exposure was a nice shot in the arm for the company. No one would
be able to go to the Disney Parks or other properties while on lockdown but being the hosting
partner of the NBA still allowed them to reach those people and benefit from their viewership.
The bubble was a massive success overall for the league. The basis of all the restarts was
on safety, but in the European leagues cases would still pop up as players traveled around, no
matter how strict policies were. In the NBA however, the bubble worked to perfection as there
were zero positive cases the entire time the league was playing. This success was twofold, as
the league got the good press for having a strict restart plan, which was needed after the Rudy
Gobert fiasco jumpstarted the shutdowns in the first place, and it also ensured that no players
would be going out of games for reasons not causally related to the games themselves.
In terms of finances, while the gate receipt losses remained, according to estimates, the
bubble preserved over $1.5 billion in revenue for the league. Much of this revenue came from
fulfilling the broadcasting contracts, however by moving out of home arenas and into the new
venue, it also left the league with the freedom to, and perhaps the necessity to, experiment
with new types of advertising. Virtual signage was a big part of this advertising push, as the
league would overlay sponsor’s logos on the court in a way not possible during normal times.
Due to not being in their home stadiums like the European teams, arena sponsors had to be
either satisfied or compensated. To accomplish this the NBA used overlays on the court that
gave the appearance of teams’ home courts, such as logos for American Airlines and Fiserv. Inc
for games that would have been played in the American Airlines Center in Miami or Fiserv
Arena in Milwaukee.
Additionally, two of the main sponsors, the presenting partner Youtube TV, and beer
brand Michelob Ultra, had their logo physically painted on the court for the NBA Finals, and
were given a virtual “courtside club” for fans, respectively. This marked the first time the
presenting partner of the finals had their logo painted on the court for a finals series, a series
that was viewed by an average of 7 million fans per game. For Michelob, this also meant that

they were the brand associated with bringing nearly 60,000 fans “into” the arenas across the
remaining 88-game regular season and playoffs.
Nearly a month after the opening of the NBA bubble, and after witnessing some of the
early success of said bubble, the NHL also implemented a similar strategy for the completion of
their own season. Like the NBA, the NHL opted for a bubble atmosphere, and also opted for an
extended playoff with only playoff teams rather than playing out the remainder of the season.
Dissimilar from the NBA though, who brought everyone competing back to a singular hub in
Orlando, the NHL had two hub cities- one in Toronto and one in Edmonton. Also unlike the
NBA, who played their games at a non-NBA venue, the NHL used the complexes of the Toronto
Maple Leafs and the Edmonton Oilers to play their games. This was both an advantage and a
disadvantage relative to the NBA.
While the NBA had a blank slate with which to operate, they also had to pay extra for
that right. The NHL on the other hand, while still having to pay for their bubbles, estimate that
the total cost was between $75 and $90 million as opposed to the $180 million paid by the
NBA. Again, despite this fee being incredible, it was seen as an investment for the league. The
main broadcasting partner of the NHL in the United States, NBC, had a contract that only ran
for one more season after this one, and without completing the season, not only would the
league have been forced to pay them back for the year, they also would have taken a massive
pay cut on the next contract. Instead, after surprisingly high viewership on the first round of the
playoffs, and relatively consistent viewership from then on, the NHL was able to go into those
negotiations with some leverage.
To compare all the leagues initial responses, while safety was paramount, it was clear
that playing out the seasons was also of the utmost of importance. From a health and financial
security standpoint, the NBA’s and NHL’s investment in bubble’s was the most effective at
ensuring that the games would go on, regardless of what transpired in society. The plan was to
eliminate any worries about a star player getting infected and being ruled out, or a having a
breakout that could threaten to derail a team for weeks on end, and after zero positive cases
between them for the entirety of the endeavor it is fair to say that plan was successful.
Additionally, this meant that they could market themselves to their sponsors and broadcasters
as being impervious to the virus, which as has been discussed previously, was vital.
That said, instituting a bubble was an incredible investment, and one that was deemed
either unfeasible or unnecessary for the Premier League and La Liga. While not being as
successful in completely eliminating the threat of COVID, with a few positive cases each
throughout the remainder of their respective seasons, not creating a bubble had a variety of
advantages for the European Leagues. For one, it meant that teams would be playing in their
own stadiums and living in their own homes. From a sponsorship standpoint, the emptiness of
the large stadiums also meant that there was more room to display banners and other
marketing tools. According to consulting firm Nielsen Sports out of the U.K., the value of this
broadcasting space was between $850,000 and $2.4 million based on the coverage of the
games and the viewership numbers of the games. In living in their own homes, players were
also in a better space mentally than many of the players in the NBA and the NHL. It is
impossible to quantify in a financial sense, although living in a hotel away from their families

and isolated from the rest of the world put a heavy mental strain on many players. NBA star
LeBron James went so far as to say that winning the championship in the 2019/20 season was
the toughest of his career due to the circumstances of the bubble, in large part due to that
mental taxation. The mental strain, while still being there as a part of the COVID scenario, was
not nearly as great on the European players, and its possible this led to them being more
effective on the field. Without being able to quantify it, it can be said that viewers would rather
watch players at full strength than at 90 percent, so this was an advantage for the European
leagues.
By not having a bubble, the European leagues were also able to get up and running
quicker than their American counterparts. The quick turnaround, and playing games in quick
succession, meant that the Premier League and La Liga finished out their seasons completely,
and with all their teams playing out all their games. Again, relative to the NBA and the NHL
where only 22 and 24 teams, respectively, competed in the bubble, this would have meant that
in a similar scenario five teams would have been sidelined from the Premier League and La Liga.
As it has not yet been addressed, it should be noted that while the leagues have been discussed
in their entirety throughout the paper thus far, it is not an even breakdown of total revenue
between all the teams within the leagues, in fact far from it.
In the NBA, teams are known as either being from a small market, like those in
Minneapolis or Oklahoma City, or from a large market, such as those in Los Angeles or New
York. The difference in value and revenue can be large between them, but at the end of the day
all NBA franchises are worth at least 1.3 billion dollars according to Forbes. There was not
perfect parity across the league, but the average franchise was valued at $2.4 billion, and most
teams were in the $1.3-$2.5 billion range and a select few pushing into the $3-$5 billion range.
The NHL average value is less, coming in at around $600 million, and with a spread of franchise
values between $300 million and $1.6 billion. These are not the revenue numbers, rather team
valuations, but it still offers a picture of how the leagues breakdown in terms of financial parity.
There is a discrepancy between top and bottom, although it pales in comparison to the
valuations of teams in Europe.
In the Premier League, the most valuable team is worth around $3.4 billion dollars, but
the lowest is worth only $133 million. The Premier League average team value is 995 million
dollars, but outside of what is called the “Top 6”, which are the most valuable teams in the
country including the likes of Manchester United and Liverpool, the most valuable team is only
worth $619 million, and the average of the non- “Top 6” is only $359 million. This goes to show
the incredible discrepancy between the top and the bottom in the Premier League, and it is the
same in Spain. The most valuable franchises in Spain are Real Madrid and Barcelona, both
coming in as some of the most valuable soccer teams on Earth, in line with or exceeding the
Top 6 in the Premier League, while the lowest rungs compare to those of the United Kingdom.
In showing the financial parity, or lack thereof among the teams in the United Kingdom
and Spain, it is clear why they did not, or perhaps could not have used a bubble in the same
way as the NHL and NBA. If the bottom five teams would have had to miss out on the end of
the season, even if they were still a part of a revenue sharing scheme from the broadcasters,
they still would have been crippled by an inability to play in a way the NBA and NHL teams

would not have been. Furthermore, the cost of the NBA bubble was worth more than an entire
team in the Premier League, which puts into perspective the incredible difference in value.
One other note comes from the financials of promotion and relegation present in
European soccer. Briefly, relegation means that the worst performing teams in the league each
year are dropped down to the lower divisions, and the best teams from the “minor leagues”
joins the top division. There is no real comparison for this practice in the United States, but
essentially it means that instead of getting the first overall pick, the worst team in a league
moves down to a lower professional tier, and the best team from that lower division moves up
to replace them. Dropping out of the Premier League or La Liga costs teams millions in
broadcasting money as well as other revenue, so the teams that were on the bottom of the
leagues at the time would have extra incentive to restart the season, as it would give them a
chance to escape the relegation zone. Had the leagues used a bubble in the way the NHL and
NBA did, some of these clubs would have been automatically relegated, having no chance to
play themselves back into safety. This likely would have prompted lawsuits brought against the
leagues on behalf of the relegated clubs to play out their games anyway, which would have
slowed down the restart even more.
The quick turnaround afforded by not needing to create a bubble was perhaps one of
the biggest reasons why Premier League and La Liga deemed them unnecessary. With the plan
in place for teams to play in their own stadiums, the leagues had no need to invest time getting
all of them in one place and locking everything down, instead getting games going as quickly as
possible once it was safe to do so. Always with an eye on the broadcasting deals, it is likely that
the Premier League and La Liga felt it was more prudent to avoid broadcaster rebates on the
next season as much as they could and focus on getting back on track for the next year.
Initial Analysis
Since most of the decisions made by the leagues were in the interest of protecting
revenues, and not necessarily generating more, the definition of success across the first two
phases of restarting play is blurry. First, it is possible to compare how the revenues of the
leagues pre-COVID compared to those post-COVID, with the lowest drop in revenue dictating
the “most successful” policies. The leagues had different remainders of their seasons, however,
which should be considered. A more accurate way to compare the effectiveness of policies,
therefore, is to use the percentage of the season remaining to estimate a theoretical maximum
expected loss for each league and compare those with the actual estimated losses for the
leagues. Even this is not so clear however, as it can be analyzed in a few ways.
In normal years, where there are no COVID concerns, sports leagues’ revenues tend
grow without fail. Thus, it is possible to base a calculation off a “normal” year’s revenues to see
how effectively the leagues were able to keep pace. To do this, first the pre-COVID, 2018/19
league revenues are multiplied by the revenue growth rate from the previous season, as this
will simulate a normal year, one devoid of Coronavirus issues. This normal year revenue is then
multiplied by the percentage of games remaining in the season relative to the total, giving a
“theoretical maximum loss” for the league. Essentially, this maximum loss shows how much the

leagues could have plausibly made in a normal season, and inversely what they stood to lose
after the pandemic hit.
The equation is crude, as it assumes that each game of the season accounts for the
same amount of revenue, and it is using the last growth rate to simulate a pandemic-free
revenue for the leagues, but it gives a comparative baseline for the leagues. Next, these
theoretical losses are compared to the estimated actual losses for the league as they have been
reported. By comparing the actual losses with the theoretical losses, the ratio of the two gives a
glimpse of how successfully the leagues kept pace with revenue projections for the 2019/20
season. In essence, this ratio shows what percentage of revenue from the suspended year the
leagues salvaged relative to a normal year. Consequently, it will be known as the salvage ratio.
From the pre-COVID section revenue section discussed previously, the revenues from
the 2018/19 season for the four leagues were as follows: the NBA made an estimated $8.76
billion, the NHL made $5.09 billion, the Premier League made $6.69 billion, and La Liga made
$3.85 billion. After accounting for the growth rates, the theoretical expected revenue for a
season without a pandemic would be NBA: $9.5 billion, NHL: $5.33 billion, Premier League:
$7.19 billion, and La Liga: $4.23 billion.
Given that the leagues stood to miss between 15% and 25% of their seasons, not
including the playoffs for the American leagues, this means that at minimum the leagues would
have been expected to lose hundreds of millions of dollars each had the seasons ended
immediately. As far as exact numbers, the NBA could have missed out on a projected $2.02
billion, the value of the 21% of their season left, the Premier League stood to miss out on
around $1.74 billion since they had 24% of the season remaining, La Liga could have lost $1.22
Billion given the nearly 29% of their season left, and the NHL could have lost around $790
million since they had the shortest remaining portion of the season. Potential lost playoff
revenue is harder to estimate, as the games only account for between 4.5% and 7.8% of games
depending on the length of the series, but it is also the time that brings in the most money from
both ticket revenue and broadcasting in American sports. For the purposes of these
calculations, despite not accounting for too many games played, the playoff revenue estimator
is 15% of the total revenue in a given year, due to their importance to broadcasting and
sponsorship. This means the NBA and NHL would have stood to lose an additional $1.44 billion
and $799 million, respectively if they also missed out on the playoffs.
The math is crude, and leaves out a bit of information, but theoretically in a normal
season, given the assumptions made, the portion of the season the leagues were suspending
could have netted them between $1.22 Billion in revenue on the low end for La Liga, up to
$3.45 billion for the NBA on the high end. The actual revenues for the leagues are not public
information yet, but estimates are available. For the COVID interrupted 2019/20 season, it is
estimated that the NBA made $8.3 billion dollars in revenue, down $1.27 billion from a nonpandemic year projection. The NHL made an estimated $4.37 billion, which was $960 million
lower than the projected revenue. The Premier League, based off these assumptions, lost an
estimated $1.59 billion from the projection, bringing their revenue to only $5.6 billion. Finally,
La Liga made an estimated $3.55 billion, losing $680 million from a normal 2019/20 projection.

Getting to the salvaged revenue ratio, this means that the NBA did the best at
preventing losses, salvaging 63% of a potential normal year’s expected revenues from the
remainder of their season. On the flip side, the Premier League salvaged only a miniscule 8.8%
of a normal year’s expected revenue from the remainder of the season. This conclusion is a bit
misleading, as it would imply that even after implementing policies to complete the season,
fulfilling broadcast and sponsorship contracts as well as possible, and playing an additional 92
games, they only salvaged revenue worth around $150 million. This result seems to indicate
that there is clearly something wrong with the math, but the answer is simple. According to
Deloitte, Premier League clubs fill out their financial reports on either May 31 or June 30.
Therefore, half of a rebate to the broadcasters worth an estimated 1 billion pounds ($1.35
billion) that could be recouped as part of a deferred payment plan negotiated amid the season
restart was not accounted for in the revenue estimation. If the Premier League’s revenue is
adjusted to include that deferred payment, the salvage ratio rises to 47.7%, equating to $830
million salvaged.
An important caveat can be made here however, as from the onset of the pandemic the
leagues already knew that the season would not be regular. This fact leads to the second way to
measure success- basing the calculations on the 2018/19 revenues without the growth factor
included. Even the most aggressive restarting plans in the wake of the pandemic still expected
the seasons to be suspended for at least a few weeks, and therefore, including the growth rate
in the calculation skews the data a bit. As was mentioned, the leagues were not planning to
make additional money, with an expectation of losing millions from ticket sales alone as the
virus continued spreading. As such, a more accurate salvage ratio should be based on the
2018/19 revenues instead of projecting a 5-9% increase then running the calculation.
By calculating everything based on the revenue from 2018/19, the results are much
more reasonable for the leagues. The NBA retains the highest salvage ratio, salvaging nearly
86% of revenue expected from the remainder of their season, with the value of the salvaged
revenue equaling $1.59 billion from the new calculation. Impressively, this value is nearly in line
with the NBA’s own estimation of how much the bubble allowed them to save, which was $1.5
billion. This means that this new calculation, based off the 2018/19 revenues, while not perfect,
is a good means of comparison.
Based off the new calculations, and accounting for the Premier League broadcasting
adjustment, all four of the leagues salvaged at least 53% of revenue, with that lowest spot
going to the NHL. That said, this 53% still equates to over $400 million dollars in revenue, so
while not being as effective as the others, the NHL still did relatively well. Additionally, the cost
of the NHL bubble, while an investment, did cost nearly $100 million so it is likely that they
made more than the $400 million that was reported. Progressing to the European Leagues, the
Premier League and La Liga, buoyed by the elimination of 7.5% and 9.8% respective growth
rates, see their salvage ratios come out to 74.7% and 72.7%. These salvage ratios indicate the
Premier League made $1.21 Billion from the decision to continue after adjusting for the
broadcast rebate, and La Liga netted $810 million from their continuation policies.
For clarity, all calculations and data have been added to tables in the appendix to ensure
understanding.

The results of these calculations offer a few interesting nuggets of information. First,
given that they had very similar response policies, the Premier League and La Liga having similar
salvage ratios is in line with what one might expect. It is surprising, therefore, that while the
NBA and NHL both instituted bubbles, their salvage ratios differed by over 30%. Now, it is not
overly surprising that the NHL ended up with the lowest salvage ratio, as the percentage of
revenue from gate receipts was markedly higher for the NHL relative to the other leagues. To
reiterate, the NHL, in a normal season, draws over a third of their revenue from gate receipts.
The next highest percentage is the NBA, but even then, they get only 22% from tickets.
Therefore, the NHL was destined to be hit harder by the behind-closed-doors mandate than the
other leagues and were unable to make up the difference in the short-term given their
relatively smaller television contracts. Like the Premier League however, by playing out the
season, the NHL gave themselves leverage in the negotiation for a new T.V. contract, as the
previous one was set to end after the COVID season.
Eyes to the Future
The analysis so far has been about the season directly interrupted by COVID; however,
the pandemic is ongoing and thus still requires ongoing policies to address it. While not as
critical as the decision to postpone and then restart the season, deciding how to progress into
the future was still a point of concern for the leagues.
In a normal year, the soccer leagues are generally start their seasons before the NBA
and NHL start theirs. A normal soccer season runs from mid-August through to late May, but
since they were unable to finish the COVID season until July, games had to get pushed back. By
not having a bubble, partially as a means of speeding up the restart, both the Premier League
and La Liga intended to get back in action as quickly as possible. The decision to get up and
running as quickly as possible was a good one, as just two months after the last season ended,
the new one had begun. Similar to the COVID interrupted season, the 2020/21 season started
with no fans. As such, the impetus was again to stress broadcasting and sponsorship,
attempting to limit the losses from the pandemic to just the one season.
To get back in the good graces of the broadcasters, both the Premier League and La Liga
scheduled their seasons to run from mid-September through to mid-May. To accomplish this,
some games were to be played during the week to make up for the loss of the time on the front
of the season. Just playing midweek games was not enough however, as to fit all the games in,
a winter break that is customary for the leagues was scrapped. In eliminating the winter break
players would be forced to play on limited rest, and this decision was another that was made
with an eye to the pocketbook rather than the field. It meant that players were essentially
playing from June 2020 until mid-May 2021 with only a month break. It also meant, though,
that the seasons would finish well before the Olympics and early enough that the 2021/22
season would begin fully on time. Again, this was done to help the broadcasters, who were no
doubt feeling that competition with the Olympics could be problematic for viewership and were
keen to get back on a usual schedule for their contracts.
The television deals for the Premier League are generally signed in 3-year intervals, and
the current contract is set to end in 2022. Even before the pandemic analysts thought that the

deals were already getting inflated and feared a drop off from the price paid by Sky TV and BT,
and this fear got compounded by the pandemic. Overseas T.V. deals have been on the rise as
interest in the league continues to grow, but after moving games out of primetime these
overseas partners have been some of the biggest proponents of rebates. The league cannot
afford to lose substantial chunks of revenue from the new T.V. deal, with 12 teams in the
league relying on the revenue sharing from them to pay the bills, so they were willing to risk
some injury to make sure they get back on track.
In Spain, La Liga had a similar policy of only signing 3-year contracts for television deals,
but in the wake of the pandemic this policy was changed in an attempt to get longer-term
commitments. The league has many different domestic and international deals, but as they
come out of the COVID season they are working to expand even more. A key part of this
endeavor is a negotiation with ESPN for the rights to broadcast games in the United States.
Currently under contract with streaming service BeIn for these rights, La Liga is attempting to
void this contract to in the wake of the pandemic. The Premier League has been the dominant
international league in the U.S. for years, and according to insiders, executives in La Liga feel
that BeIn has been limiting their growth in the country by way of just showing games on their
select streaming service, as opposed to on network television. These negotiations with ESPN
can therefore be seen as a way to expand and emerge in the American market to recoup some
of their losses from the pandemic.
The negotiations with ESPN are ongoing as of the time of writing, but an early sign of
success and rebounding for La Liga was evident only a days after the restart of their season. In
an article posted in September, reporting service Reuters said that the league had already seen
advertising revenue grow 20% from the COVID season, as companies responded the huge
uptick in viewership during the shutdown. As such, despite it not completely counteracting the
lack of fans in seats, it was a good sign for the league in the interim.
As for the NBA and NHL, their seasons both started later and finished later than the
European Leagues. In fact, the bubbles of the NBA and NHL were barely underway when the
Premier League and La Liga finished their restarted seasons. Normally finishing in June, the NBA
did not complete their playoffs until October, and the NHL, who also would have finished in
June normally, finished in late September. Similar to the European leagues, effort was made to
start as quickly as possible, as both American leagues felt the pressure of the looming Olympics
and start of the NFL season in the summer. To accommodate the time crunch, both American
leagues were again forced to shorten their seasons, with the NBA planning for teams to play a
72-game regular season, down 10 from normal, and the NHL planning on playing only 56 games
in the regular season, down 26 from normal.
The leagues did not plan on having many, if any, in-person fans for their seasons either,
and revenue projections from January for the NHL stated that they were on track to lose out on
an additional $1 billion in the 2020/21 season relative to a normal year. To recover some of
those losses, knowing that losing gate receipts was a foregone conclusion, the NHL
implemented the most aggressive sponsorship changes of any of the leagues. For the first time,
the NHL allowed helmet sponsors for their teams, much like the NBA’s jersey sponsorship
initiative from a few years ago. Second, the NHL sold naming rights for their divisions, with

Honda, Scotiabank, Discover, and Massmutual becoming named sponsors for the league.
Finally, to claw back a bit more of the potential losses, the NHL also partnered with food
delivery app SkipTheDishes. It is unknown how much these sponsorships are worth, but
obviously the league felt that it was imperative to the success and the longevity of the league to
sell-out in the short-term.
All these actions were taken by the NHL before the beginning of the season, but luckily
for the NHL, their broadcasting contract with NBC expired during the 2021 season. The league
had seen great viewership numbers even through the pandemic, and this leverage led to a deal
being struck in early March where they agreed to a new 7-year broadcasting contract with ESPN
worth an estimated $400 million per year. If that estimation is correct, it would constitute a
100% increase over their prior $200 million per year domestic contract with NBC, and it is
possible that other partners also sign deals to collectively bring the new deal up to $600 million
per year. For the league that was hit the hardest by the initial shutdown and was expected to
lose nearly a billion dollars before the season, this deal was a massive success.
For the NBA, despite finishing the previous season in the best position, their outlook on
the future is perhaps the most precarious. The biggest decision made by the league, to start in
December rather than on Martin Luther King Jr. day, was achieved, but unlike the NHL they
have not had much success with additional branding and sponsorship deals. The shirt
sponsorship deal, while effective, cannot be seen as an addition to revenues like the helmet
initiative in the NHL, as it was in place pre-pandemic. Additionally, while the broadcasting deals
are huge for the NBA, the contracts do not expire until 2024/25, and therefore the league
cannot expect broadcasting gains to buoy the lack of gate receipts for the upcoming season. So,
while the NBA has done everything it can, including continuing the playoff play-in tournament,
an addition from the bubble that was widely touted as a success, there is not a lot of room for
the NBA to make up the potential losses from gate receipts. As a result, the NBA has been on
the forefront of reopening their stadiums, with many teams letting in up to 4,000 fans. Letting
in fans, at the end of the day, is not a decision the league can make on its own. States have
their own policies for health mandates, and as such some teams have up to 30% stadium
capacity while others have zero. This is not a great sign for the league, but there are not many
more avenues for the league to recoup losses other than waiting out the virus.
Overall Success
The COVID pandemic was a catastrophic financial hit for all industries around the world,
and the NBA, NHL, Premier League, and La Liga felt that hit just like everyone else. Their
responses in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak were varied, but each league was able
to finish out the postponed season, as well as starting a new one. This should be viewed as a
success in itself; however, the goal of this paper was to find if there was a single league strategy
that was more successful than the rest, emphasizing the long-term over the short-term. The
answer is not cut and dry, but it does seem, at least in terms of this long-term security, that the
best way to handle the pandemic was to approach it with agility, with the goal of restarting as
quickly as possible- the way the European leagues did.

While the bubble of the NBA was the most effective policy for retaining revenue in the
postponed season, the NBA stands to lose the most from this new season. The combination of
the time it took to set up the bubble and the number of games remaining in the regular season
and playoffs meant that both the NHL and NBA were in positions of shortening their next
season to avoid running into broadcast competition in the summer. The European leagues did
not have the same issue. The European leagues, in turn, were able to play out the entirety of
their postponed seasons as well as allowing them to play a full slate of games in 2020/21.
Diluting financial success down to the actions of the league alone does not tell the
whole story though. Despite having a bleaker outlook on the next season or two, the NBA and
NHL are not in a position where they could have done much more to help themselves. This
paper has looked primarily at the actions taken by the leagues themselves, but the countries’
policies in response to COVID also have bearing on the leagues ability to make money. The
United States has had by far the most instances of the Coronavirus throughout most of the
pandemic, and despite shutting down in March, were still gaining an average of around 20,000
cases per day by June 2020. The European countries had a better initial shutdown and were
therefore not dealing with the same number of cases as the in the United States. This is not a
condemnation of the U.S., nor is it saying that the Europeans handled the situation perfectly,
but the case totals did have an impact on how the leagues were able to respond.
Certain revenue streams, though, specifically gate receipts, are tied to the ability of the
countries to get the pandemic under control. The longer it takes to reign in the virus, the longer
it will be before arenas can be safely opened, especially given that the NBA and NHL play games
indoors. Combining the relative reliance on gate receipts that the NBA and NHL have, if all else
was equal in terms of broadcasting revenue and sponsorships, the NBA and NHL would still be
worse off than the Premier League and La Liga as long as games are played behind-closeddoors.
It is possible however, to do one final calculation where the gate receipts are netted out
and one final salvage ratio is revealed from the initial suspended season. Given the state of the
world, there was no way that people were going to be in seats during the restarts, so by
eliminating these expected gate receipts from the calculation, the results offer a clearer picture
of how well the leagues responded given what they could control and gives one last
comparative baseline for the leagues. To calculate this last ratio, there were a few steps. First
2018/19 total revenues were multiplied by the percentage of that revenue that came from gate
receipts. Next, this product was multiplied by the percentage of the season left. The resulting
product represented the gate receipt revenue that was expected to be lost in the regular
season. For the American leagues the playoffs also had a multiplier that accounted for them.
After finding the total revenue expected from gate receipts for the remainder of the season,
this number was added back to the actual reported revenues. This calculation left a revenue
that had gate receipts built in, allowing the calculation of one final salvage ratio.
The biggest “winner” after netting out the gate receipts is the NHL. Any league that
loses a revenue stream that makes up more than a third of their total would be adversely
represented in the first two calculations, but by netting out a factor leagues were unable to
control, all the leagues are finally on a level playing field. The NBA still had the highest salvage

ratio, which was 107.25%. This means that after netting out the foregone loss of gate receipts,
the league actually made more money from other sources than they would have expected to in
a normal season. The NHL had the second highest salvage ratio after adjusting for gate receipts,
at 89.49%. La Liga and the Premier League were the final two respectively, although they were
quite close to the NHL’s number. The results were an 88.12% salvage ratio for La Liga and
87.98% for the Premier League.
Now, this last calculation is specific to the restarted season, but it can also project into
the future in saying that any analysis based on a lack of people in the stands will relatively
disadvantage the American leagues. A quick calculation for the new season reveals that losing
out on gate receipts for an entire year would “cost” the NBA around $1.93 billion dollars in lost
revenue, and $1.86 billion for the NHL, versus only $887 million and $596 billion lost for the
Premier League and La Liga respectively. Therefore, even if they were to make hundreds of
millions of dollars more than the soccer leagues from different revenue streams, the NBA and
NHL would still be relatively worse off than the European counterparts in the new season. All of
this is to say that while the Premier League and La Liga have a better outlook on the future, the
NBA was still the most successful in terms of policies they could control, and the NHL as well,
while being the least effective given their revenue breakdown, was actual the second most
effective when everything is compared on a level playing field.
In conclusion, perhaps it was too much to assume that any one league would be able to
weather the pandemic in its entirety substantially better than the rest simply through their
response policies. The pandemic is ever changing, and it is possible that as vaccines continue to
roll out, and national and state regulations continue to loosen, that the NBA and NHL’s outlook
can change by getting fans in seats by the playoffs. Further, through different calculations, a
case could be made that all the leagues have a claim to a serious level of personal success. As
the situation stands currently though, the combination of all the policies indicates that the
Premier League and La Liga have the best financial outlook the future. One thing that can be
said for certain is that none of the leagues are in completely dire straits, and once the countries
begin to open up, they all expect the get back to their normal revenue growth. For now,
though, the leagues are in a bit of a limbo, just waiting for when that sense of normalcy returns.
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